


Exploiting Internet Surveillance Systems

Defcon 18, 2010

Decius






The “Great Debate”

How should the information infrastructure of the future balance the individual’s desire for privacy with the state’s interest in monitoring suspected criminals?





Steve Jackson Games

Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act

- Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
 - Passed in 1994
 - Requires Telecommunications Companies to cooperate with the interception of traffic on their networks by providing technical interfaces for that purpose
 - Originally did not apply to “Information Services.”
- In 2005 the FCC ruled that CALEA applies to broadband Internet providers
 - The Cisco Architecture for Lawful Intercept pre-dated this ruling
 - By 2005 Some European countries already required these interfaces for Internet networks
 - Providers may voluntarily create these interfaces even when not required to
 - The provider is going to have to grant access to the communications somehow
 - A well defined interface makes wiretapping less disruptive to network operations

IETF Policy on Wiretapping (RFC 2804)

The IETF will not consider requirements for wiretapping in protocol designs

- The IETF is an international body and can't address the laws of every country
- Wiretapping the Internet is either easy or its impossible
 - RFC 1984 – Development of the Internet requires wide availability of strong cryptographic technology
- The Internet should be free from security loopholes
 - Adding a requirement for wiretapping makes protocols more complex
 - Complexity begets vulnerability
 - The interfaces that provide wiretap access could be used with authorization
- “On the other hand,” wiretapping technologies should be openly described
 - “The IETF believes that the publication of such mechanisms, and the publication of known weaknesses in such mechanisms, is a Good Thing.”
 - In keeping with this philosophy, Cisco and the IETF published RFC 3924 – The Cisco Architecture for Lawful Intercept in IP networks

The Cisco Architecture for Lawful Intercept

- The Cisco Architecture for Lawful Intercept in IP networks
 - Based on the Lawful Intercept architecture defined by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
 - An SNMPv3 interface that provides the ability to wiretap IP networks
 - Described in RFC 3924 and some Internet Drafts
 - Publish in 2003/2004
 - Implemented in edge router and switch models
 - 7600/10000/12000/AS5000
 - A myriad of other companies support the same overall architecture for Lawful Intercept
 - Different vendors may supply a service provider with various interoperable components of the overall architecture for lawful intercept

The Cisco Architecture for Lawful Intercept: RFC 3924




Figure 1: Intercept Architecture

Source: RFC 3924
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).

Mediation Device Vendors

(many also make Intercept Access Points (IAPs))

Mediation device equipment suppliers include:

- Aqsacom
- ETI
- Group 2000
- Pine Digital Security
- Verint
- SS8
- SUNTECH Intelligent Solutions
- Utimaco
- Accuris
- ATIS systems
- DigiVox
- GTEN AG
- NICE Systems
- Teletron
- Urmet Group

The Interception Request

```
CTapStreamIpEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
    cTapStreamIpIndex Integer32,
    cTapStreamIpInterface Integer32,
    cTapStreamIpAddrType InetAddressType,
cTapStreamIpDestinationAddress InetAddress,
cTapStreamIpDestinationLength InetAddressPrefixLength,
cTapStreamIpSourceAddress InetAddress,
cTapStreamIpSourceLength InetAddressPrefixLength,
    cTapStreamIpTosByte Integer32,
    cTapStreamIpTosByteMask Integer32,
    cTapStreamIpFlowId Integer32,
    cTapStreamIpProtocol Integer32,
cTapStreamIpDestL4PortMin InetPortNumber,
cTapStreamIpDestL4PortMax InetPortNumber,
cTapStreamIpSourceL4PortMin InetPortNumber,
cTapStreamIpSourceL4PortMax InetPortNumber,
    cTapStreamIpInterceptEnable TruthValue,
    cTapStreamIpInterceptedPackets Counter32,
    cTapStreamIpInterceptDrops Counter32,
    cTapStreamIpStatus RowStatus }

```

The Interception Request

```
CTapMediationEntry ::= SEQUENCE {  
    cTapMediationContentId Integer32,  
    cTapMediationDestAddressType InetAddressType,  
    cTapMediationDestAddress InetAddress,  
    cTapMediationDestPort InetPortNumber,  
    cTapMediationSrcInterface InterfaceIndexOrZero,  
    cTapMediationRtcpPort InetPortNumber,  
    cTapMediationDscp Dscp,  
    cTapMediationDataType Integer32,  
    cTapMediationRetransmitType Integer32,  
    cTapMediationTimeout DateAndTime,  
    cTapMediationTransport INTEGER,  
    cTapMediationNotificationEnable TruthValue,  
    cTapMediationStatus RowStatus }
```

Security Concerns for Lawful Intercept


- Preventing the subject from discovering the surveillance
- Preventing the subject from manipulating the surveillance
 - Transmitting information that was not collected
 - Inducing the collection of information that was not transmitted
 - The Eavesdropper's Dilemma: What do you do with packets that have the wrong checksum?
- Protecting the interface from unauthorized use
 - Preventing the provisioning of unauthorized wiretaps
 - Preventing an authorized wiretap from collecting information outside the scope of the authorization




Gaining Unauthorized Access




An example network...



This is how things are supposed to work.



An Attack...



Unauthorized Interception Requests

- Single, properly authenticated SNMPv3 packet accessing the TAP-MIB
 1. The correct username and password are required
 2. Attacker would need the correct SNMPv3 EngineID, EngineBoots, and EngineTime values
 - These values are intended to prevent authenticated SNMPv3 messages from being replayed
 - They can be obtained with a single unauthenticated transaction
 - They can be shared between clients
 3. Attacker would need to be able to send a packet that the interface will receive
 - Packet filtering might interfere with this.
 4. Encryption might prove to be an obstacle

CVE-2008-0960 – Bypassing Authentication

- SNMPv3 Message Digests are the first 12 bytes of a cryptographic hash of the message contents combined with a secret key, which is a combination of the password and the EngineID of the SNMP service
- The RFC says message digests that aren't 12 bytes long should be thrown out but many implementations didn't.
- The result of the local HMAC calculation is going to be greater than 12 bytes, so many implementations performed this comparison operation:

```
memcmp( myHMACbuffer, packetHMACbuffer, packetHMAClength )
```

- Attacker can send 256 messages with different 1-byte HMACs and one will be accepted.

CVE-2008-0960 – Bypassing Authentication

- Disclosed in June, 2008
- Multiple Vendors impacted (Linux, Solaris, OSX, Juniper, and Cisco)
- Some implementations were vulnerable for over 6 years
- **Most Cisco software that supports Lawful Intercept was not vulnerable**
 - IOS 12.3(7)XI before 12.3(7)XI8a
 - 12.3(7)XI supports lawful intercept in 10000 Series Routers
- Cisco 10000 series routers
 - Edge router for broadband service providers
 - Supports IP “VPNs”



Brute Forcing SNMPv3 Usernames and Passwords

```
usmMIBBasicGroup OBJECT-GROUP OBJECTS {  
    usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels,  
    usmStatsNotInTimeWindows,  
    usmStatsUnknownUserNames,  
    usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs,  
    usmStatsWrongDigests,  
    usmStatsDecryptionErrors,  
    usmUserSpinLock,  
    usmUserSecurityName,  
    usmUserCloneFrom,  
    usmUserAuthProtocol,  
    usmUserAuthKeyChange,  
    usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange,  
    usmUserPrivProtocol,  
    usmUserPrivKeyChange,  
    usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange,  
    usmUserPublic,  
    usmUserStorageType,  
    usmUserStatus }  
}
```

Lack of Audit Trails

- Attacks on SNMPv3 authentication are noisy – it would be nice if you could monitor those attacks using traps!
- Cisco's Configuration Guide for Lawful Intercept advises network administrators to enable SNMP trap notifications
- Cisco's documentation implies that traps will be sent “for packets with an incorrect SHA/MD5 authentication key or for a packet that is outside the authoritative SNMP engine's window (for example, outside configured access lists or time ranges).”
- No IOS version I tested sent authentication failure traps for SNMPv3 messages with the wrong username, password, or Engine values.
 - Authentication failure traps were generated for SNMPv3 requests if they came from a source IP address that was blocked by a group access list.
 - Cisco determined that this behavior is as intended.
 - CSCsz29235: The documentation for 'snmp-server enable traps snmp' command stated that SNMPv3 authentication failure traps can be generated, which is incorrect. The documentation has been updated to indicate that SNMPv3 authentication failure traps are not generated.

TAP-MIB – The attacker can turn the audit trail off!

```
CTapMediationEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
    cTapMediationContentId Integer32,
    cTapMediationDestAddressType InetAddressType,
    cTapMediationDestAddress InetAddress,
    cTapMediationDestPort InetPortNumber,
    cTapMediationSrcInterface InterfaceIndexOrZero,
    cTapMediationRtcpPort InetPortNumber,
    cTapMediationDscp Dscp,
    cTapMediationDataType Integer32,
    cTapMediationRetransmitType Integer32,
    cTapMediationTimeout DateAndTime,
    cTapMediationTransport INTEGER,
    cTapMediationNotificationEnable TruthValue,
    cTapMediationStatus RowStatus }
```

```
cTapMediationNotificationEnable OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      TruthValue
    MAX-ACCESS  read-create
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "This variable controls the generation of any notifications or
        informs by the MIB agent for this table entry."
    DEFVAL { true }
    ::= { cTapMediationEntry 12 }
```

The Audit Trail Problem exists in many architectures

- The “Athens Affair”
 - Described in IEEE Spectrum Article – July 2007
 - So we’re clear, no Cisco equipment was involved in this incident
 - Occurred in 2004/2005
 - Malware was installed on Ericsson cellular telephone switches
 - Used “rootkit” like techniques to hide from switch operators
 - Was discovered by Ericsson staff while auditing a core dump to isolate a bug
 - Cellphones of Greek government officials were monitored
 - At least 100 subjects
 - Included the Greek Prime Minister
 - Malware used Lawful Intercept code in the phone switch
 - According to the IEEE article, the interface for managing intercepts was separate from the software that actually performed the intercepts
 - The logs were kept in the management interface
 - The separation of audit trails from the core functionality is a fundamental architectural flaw in a lot of Lawful Intercept technology



Why is the audit trail problem a security issue?

Because allegations of misuse of the surveillance system cannot be investigated.





What technology allows the user to turn the logs off?

- UNIX Shells?
 - DHCP Servers?
 - SMTP Servers?
 - HTTP Servers?
 - RADIUS Servers?
- 

European Data Retention Policies

- Directive on Mandatory Retention of Communications Traffic Data

- Enacted March 2006

- Requires service providers to retain for 6 months to 2 years

- to trace and identify the **source** of a communication;

- to trace and identify the **destination** of a communication;

- to identify the **date, time and duration** of a communication;

- to identify the **type** of communication;

- to identify the communication **device**;

- to identify the **location** of mobile communication equipment.

Your use of the network must be recorded and is subject to investigation after the fact.

Their surveillance of the network must not be recorded and cannot be audited.

What is up with that?



TAP-MIB – Flexibility of the Output Stream


```
CtapMediationEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
    cTapMediationContentId Integer32,
    cTapMediationDestAddressType InetAddressType,
    cTapMediationDestAddress InetAddress,
    cTapMediationDestPort InetPortNumber,
    cTapMediationSrcInterface InterfaceIndexOrZero,
    cTapMediationRtcpPort InetPortNumber,
    cTapMediationDscp Dscp,
    cTapMediationDataType Integer32,
    cTapMediationRetransmitType Integer32,
    cTapMediationTimeout DateAndTime,
    cTapMediationTransport INTEGER,
    cTapMediationNotificationEnable TruthValue,
    cTapMediationStatus RowStatus }

cTapMediationTransport OBJECT-TYPE
    SYNTAX      INTEGER {
                                udp(1),
                                rtpNack(2),
                                tcp(3),
                                sctp(4)
                            }
    MAX-ACCESS  read-create
    STATUS      current
    DESCRIPTION
        "The protocol used in transferring intercepted data to the
        Mediation Device. The following protocols may be supported:
            udp:      PacketCable udp format
            rtpNack: RTP with Nack resilience
            tcp:      TCP with head of line blocking
            sctp:      SCTP with head of line blocking "
    ::= { cTapMediationEntry 11 }
```


Packet Spoofing and Access Lists

- Full Out of Band management designs can limit access to SNMP
 - Expensive
 - SNMP connectivity is an indicator of network health
- Many Service Providers use SNMPv3 “Infrastructure” Access Control Lists
- The Interception Request is a single UDP packet – you could spoof it
 - Obtaining or guessing the SNMPv3 “Engine” values is difficult but not theoretically impossible
 - Engine values can be shared between hosts
- Attacker might want some interactivity anyway
 - SNMPv3 Engine values can be obtained with a simple request
 - Helpful error messages when trying to brute force credentials

Interception Request



Output Stream




Attacker's Server



Internet

Service Provider Network

Service Provider Management Network




Mediation Device



Other Customers

IAP Edge Router



Surveillance Target



But, ISP Service LANs are impenetrable!

1. No, they're not.
2. There are plenty of people who have legitimate access to the service LAN who are not supposed to be using lawful intercept. **The lack of audit trails in this architecture are an invitation to insider misuse.**
3. When we meet the attacker half way with functionality we build into the network, we lower the cost of their attack and hence increase its attractiveness.

Said another way - if the lawful intercept system is easy to access from the service LAN this creates a motive to attack the network which might not exist if performing surveillance from that network was more difficult.


Another kind of ACL

- SNMPv3 User-Group Access Control Lists
 - Can be used to lock access to Lawful Intercept down to the IP address of the Mediation Device
 - Generates an audit trail!
 - Still susceptible to spoofing
 - Ultimately useful when coupled with encryption
 - Not well documented


Encryption

- “Although encryption is not necessarily a requirement, it is highly recommended...”
- SNMPv3 Encryption
 - Protects you from CVE-2008-0960
 - Insider attacks are a risk (spoofing, no audit trail, output stream goes anywhere)
- IP Sec ESP
 - Mentioned in the Internet Draft for the TAP-MIB
 - The only way to encrypt the output stream
 - Only effective if coupled with a User-Group access control list




Interception Request




Output Stream




Attacker's Server



Mediation Device



Other Customers



IAP Edge Router



Surveillance Target



How practical is this attack?

- What I think service providers are doing:
 - Most service providers are using SNMPv3 “Infrastructure” IP Access Control Lists
 - Some service providers were vulnerable to CVE-2008-0960
 - Many service providers are not using encryption
 - Few service providers are using SNMPv3 User-Group IP Access Control Lists
- What that means:
 - SNMPv3 “Engine” values are impractical to obtain from source addresses that are not in the “Infrastructure” Access Control List
 - Attacks from addresses on that list are practical in many real world deployments
 - The problem is particularly bad when coupled with CVE-2008-0960

Where should security issues be addressed?

Design



Implementation



Deployment

Recommendations for Proper Deployment


- Make sure you've patched CVE-2008-0960!
- Use Encryption – specifically IP Sec
- Use a User-Group IP Access Control List to lock the Lawful Intercept user to the IP address of the Mediation Device
- Review your overall approach to protecting network infrastructure, the mediation device, and network management systems from attack
- If possible, build out of band management networks

Recommendations for the User-based Security Model for SNMPv3

- Make authentication errors less helpful to an attacker
- Send traps or informs when authentication failures occur
- Make Engine Values more difficult to predict and share
 - SYN-Cookies cannot be guessed and they are tied to a source address
 - This will cut down on packet spoofing in SNMPv3

Recommendations for Lawful Intercept


- Use a different port
 - Make it easier to filter
 - SNMP over TCP would help prevent spoofing
- Allow the router administrator to limit the addresses for the output stream
- Move notification control into the router configuration
 - Network Administrators should not be able to use notifications to monitor surveillance, nor should they be able to direct copies of the output stream to unauthorized destination addresses they control
 - Verifying notification and output stream address agreement between the router configuration and the interception request would prevent abuse by either party
 - Multiple destinations could be configured for notifications about taps of varying sensitivity, and interception requests could select the appropriate one.



NSA
Mediation Device
192.168.13.23




FBI
Mediation Device
192.168.13.37



IAP Edge Router

Configured Notification
Addresses:
192.168.13.23
192.168.13.37



What is going to happen in the future?

- Illegal wiretapping used to be really easy
 - Telco junction boxes were easy to access
 - Frequency scanners could monitor wireless phones
- Illegal wiretapping has been getting harder
 - Wireless systems have incorporated link layer encryption
 - Tapping wired infrastructure increasingly requires expensive protocol analyzers
 - Software defined radios might make some of this cheap again in the future
- We may never see perfect end-to-end Internet encryption
 - People aren't broadly adopting end-to-end encryption solutions, preferring point-to-point application layer or link layer encryption that is "baked in" and seamless
 - Improving link layer encryption in wired and wireless systems will reduce illegal wiretapping

Should we build lawful wiretapping infrastructure?

- The consensus view of academic security researchers is that the risks involved in creating permanent wiretapping infrastructure are too great.
 - See Susan Landau and Whitfield Diffie
 - Privacy on the line
- The consensus view of law enforcement is that they like to wiretap suspects.
 - The question we get to ask may not be whether or not to build this infrastructure, but what kind of infrastructure we want to build.
- Wiretapping can either be performed with temporary or permanent devices
 - Temporary devices can be installed “out doors” where no audit trail exists
 - Permanent infrastructure can take one of two forms:
 - ETSI style systems, where minimization is performed by service providers
 - “Klein Declaration” style systems, where minimization is performed by Law Enforcement/Intelligence

For example: The Klein Declaration




PERSONAL INFORMATION REDACTED FROM THIS PAGE

*Study Group 3 LGX/Splitter Wiring, San Francisco
Issue 1, 12/10/02*

Mathew F. Casamassima,

Splitter to SG3 LGX Connectivity

The Tables in this section give the splitter to SG3 LGX connectivity as shown with in the bounds of this box.



AT&T Proprietary

KLEIN C-46

SER 122

The Klein Declaration

- In 2006 Mark Klein filed a declaration in an EFF lawsuit over warrantless wiretapping
- The Klein Declaration provides a technical description of a telecommunications monitoring system alleged to be operated by the National Security Agency
- The Klein Declaration describes the use of a fiber-optic splitter to send the entire content of backbone links to a special monitoring room for analysis
- On the other hand, the Cisco Architecture for Lawful Intercept only collects the specific traffic flows requested by the LEA
 - This allows the LEA to only collect information authorized by a warrant
 - The Cisco Architecture is not a secret
 - In these respects, the Cisco Architecture may protect personal privacy better

What kind of wiretapping infrastructure should we build?

- The key difference between the Klein and Cisco architectures is the presence of human checks and balances.
- The value of the service provider access control provided by ETSI style wiretapping infrastructure may be worth the risk of the sort of unauthorized access described in this talk
 - This view runs against the grain of the consensus view of security researchers
 - You cannot effectively control the use of portable protocol analyzers, but permanent infrastructure must have some kind of access control
 - That access control may improve security if it is effective:
 - We know that verification of warrants or other legal authority is taking place
 - The architecture is open to the public for peer review
 - Other avenues of access can be closed off
 - The verification of legal authority needs to be credible

Peer Review Matters

- Cisco did the right thing by publishing their architecture for Lawful Intercept
- Lawful Intercept is a matter of public interest
 - It is helpful if people can see and understand how surveillance is performed
 - The way that these systems perform minimization and prevent unauthorized use is a part of the checks and balances that ensure that the surveillance being performed is legally appropriate
- Technical peer review of Lawful Intercept architectures helps ensure that they are secure
- There are many architectures and vendor solutions for Lawful Intercept that have not been described in similar public documentation and have not been subjected to peer review
- We have no reason to suspect that technology we cannot review is appropriately designed – every deployed technology has security vulnerabilities

What can you do to prevent illegal wiretapping?

- Look for ways to encrypt insecure link layers with seamless technologies
- Peer Review lawful intercept systems to discover and disclose security weaknesses and vulnerabilities
- Insist on lawful intercept systems that are:
 - Secure
 - Subjected to open peer review
 - Auditable
 - Incorporate appropriate checks and balances
- Support organizations that are challenging the status quo



**We aren't going to make things better if we're
afraid to ask challenging questions.**

