

Let's Screw With nMap



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Hellfire Security

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
Overview

- Nosey Bastards!
- All About Packet Normalization
- Working It All Out
- Putting It Into Practice
- Finishing Up



Network Defenders

- We see scans and probes of our network every day
- From the inside and from the outside
- Everybody is targeting us
- Identifying our assets






How They Do It

- Network stack implementation is highly discretionary
- Differences identify the operating system type and version
- Allowing Attackers to identify their targets
- By matching the headers of their target to known operating system implementations



If your target . . .



- + Has a TTL of 128
- + Uses the following options
 - + MSS of 1460
 - + Single NOP
 - + Window Size 0
 - + Single NOP
 - + Single NOP
 - + Ending SACK

... then it's likely a Windows 2003 Sever!



Implications

- If they identify your assets ...
- They know their weaknesses
- How to attack them successfully
- Without triggering your sensors





TSA-Style patdowns . . .



It's fact of life



But does it have to be?

No!



Why can't we . . .

- Remove the differences
- To remove their advantage
- Strip them of their ability to fingerprint
- To significantly reduce their chance of success



My Answer

Packet



ization





OK. What is packet normalization?

- Had anyone thought of this before?
- Not an entirely developed concept
- Many expressions but most incomplete ...






Normalization vs. Scrubbing

- **Scrubbing** is to do away with; cancel
- **Normalization** is to make normal, especially to cause to conform to a standard or norm
- Both are seen in varying degrees



Scrubbing

- ⊕ Used by a number of firewalls
 - ⊕ Randomize IP ID
 - ⊕ Clear IP DF
- ⊕ Also ...
 - ⊕ Set IP tos/dscp, and ttl
 - ⊕ IP Fragment Reassembly
- ⊕ Primarily Concern
 - ⊕ Policy Violations
 - ⊕ Abnormal Packets
 - ⊕ Abnormal Flows



OpenBSD




netfilter
firewalling, NAT, and packet mangling for linux




Scrubbing

- Custom patch for netfilter
 - Random IP ID
 - Randomize TCP Timestamp
 - Randomize TCP SEQ
 - Clear IP tos/dscp
 - IP TTL Tinkering
- Developed by Nicolas Bareil
- Mentions fingerprint prevention
- Host Only




OpenBSD



Scrubbing

- ⊕ Used by some network devices such as Cisco ACE and ASA
 - ⊕ Random TCP SEQ
 - ⊕ Clear TCP Reserved, and URG
 - ⊕ Clears TCP Options
 - ⊕ Minimum IP TTL
- ⊕ Fragment Reassembly too ...
- ⊕ Primarily Concern
 - ⊕ Policy Violations
 - ⊕ Abnormal Packets
 - ⊕ Abnormal Flows



Incoming Normalization

- ⊕ Used by IPS and IDS devices
 - ⊕ IP Fragment Reassembly
 - ⊕ IP TTL Evasion
- ⊕ Primarily Concern
 - ⊕ Detect Attacks
 - ⊕ Detection Evasion



Outgoing Normalization?

Not Really





Fingerprinting Process

- TCP, UDP, and ICMP probes are sent
- Compile results into fingerprint


```
Fingerprint Linux 2.6.17 - 2.6.24
Class Linux | Linux | 2.6.X | general purpose
SEQ(SP=A5-D5%GCD=1-6%ISR=A7-D7%TI=Z%II=I%TS=U)
OPS(O1=M400C%O2=M400C%O3=M400C%O4=M400C%O5=M400C%O6=M400C)
WIN(W1=8018%W2=8018%W3=8018%W4=8018%W5=8018%W6=8018)
ECN(R=Y%DF=Y%T=3B-45%TG=40%W=8018%O=M400C%CC=N%Q=)
T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=3B-45%TG=40%S=0%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=)
T2(R=N)
T3(R=Y%DF=Y%T=3B-45%TG=40%W=8018%S=0%A=S+%F=AS%O=M400C%RD=0%Q=)
T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=3B-45%TG=40%W=0%S=A%A=Z%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T5(R=Y%DF=Y%T=3B-45%TG=40%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=3B-45%TG=40%W=0%S=A%A=Z%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)
T7(R=Y%DF=Y%T=3B-45%TG=40%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
U1(DF=N%T=3B-45%TG=40%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUD=G)
IE(DFI=N%T=3B-45%TG=40%CD=S)
```

- Compare against database
- Identify operating system




Where to Start?

- Nmap fingerprint database
- What about other fingerprinting tools?
 - xprobe2
 - amap
 - Vulnerability scanners ... Nessus, Et. Al
- Best to disrupt any existing patterns




Scrubbing

- Clear out any unnecessary values
 - IP ToS/DCSP/Traffic Class Cleared
 - IP ECN Cleared
 - TCP URG Flag and URG Pointer Cleared
- Randomize anything that you can
 - IP ID
- IP TTL/HOP Limit? TCP Options?



OpenBSD



netfilter
firewalling, NAT, and packet mangling for linux



Outgoing Normalization



Normalizing (IP Time-To-Live / Hop Limit)

- Make some assumptions
 - Originally Well-Known TTL
 - Decrements Only
 - Traveled < 32 hops
- Back into Original Starting TTL
- Estimate number of hops traveled
- Recalibrate current TTL
- Using Starting TTL of 255



Normalizing (IP Time-To-Live / Hop Limit)

```
If <= 32 traveled = 32-current Then ttl = 255 - traveled  
If <= 64 traveled = 64-current Then ttl = 255 - traveled  
If <= 128 traveled = 128-current Then ttl = 255 - traveled  
Else ttl = current
```

- ⊕ Start with the lowest well known TTL first!
- ⊕ Several exceptions to this normalization ...
- ⊕ Will be discussed later



Normalizing (TCP Options)

- Assumptions
 - Only Few Well Known Options Needed
 - Order is unimportant
- Requirement ... Values can't be changed
- Read necessary options
- Discard the rest
- Rewrite options in proper order
- NOP ... till the end of the options



Normalizing (TCP Options)

- Options selected ... And their order
 - MSS
 - Window
 - SACK
 - MD5 ... if present
- After processing ...

MSS = 1460
Window = 0
SACK
NOP
NOP
NOP



Making everyone All Together same




With IDGuard



Selecting The Platform

- ⊕ Identified Suitable Hardware
 - ⊕ Already Modified By Others
 - ⊕ Documentation Available ... Mikrotik Routerboards
- ⊕ Identified Suitable Operating System
 - ⊕ Available Base
 - ⊕ Writeable File System ... OpenWrt
- ⊕ Best to develop in a VM first!



Building the Development Environment

- Download Debian v6.0 Net-install CD-ROM
- Build a VMWare VM
- Install rcp100 from Sourceforge
- Configure rcp100 routing functions



Building the Development Environment



Before RCP100 Installation

```
apt-get update
apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)
apt-get install ncurses-dev, bridge-utils, make, g++, rsync
```

RCP100 Installation

```
wget http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/rcp100/rcp100/rcp100-0.99.4.tar.bz2
mkdir /opt/rcp
tar -xjvf rcp100-X.Y.Z.tar.bz2 /opt/rcp
cd /opt/rcp
```

```
./configure
make
su
make install
exit
```

--> RCP "README" for more information

After RCP Installation

Copy contents of rcp folder "operating system" subfolders into matching VM locations

Configuring the Development Environment



Configure VM Adapters

First: Local LAN (Bridged)
Second: Virtual LAN (Host-Only) --> Same As "BackTrack"

Configure RCP100 (via <http://localhost>)

----- Interfaces

- Eth0: Local LAN (192.168.2.60)
- Eth1: Virtual LAN (9.0.0.10)

Routing

- RIP on both interfaces
- Redistribute RIP

DNS

- 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4

Deploying the Kernel Module

- Download IDguard v0.50
- Install IDGuard



Deploying the Kernel Module

IDGuard Installation

```
wget http://downloads.sourceforge.net/project/idguard/idguard_v0.50_linux_networking.tar.bz2
mkdir /opt/idguard
tar -xjvf idguard_v0.50_linux_networking.tar.bz2 /opt/idguard
cd /opt/idguard

./configure
su
make
sudo insmod idguard.ko
```



OK . . . What worked?



I am really tired of those nosey bastards!





What Didn't Work

- ToS/DCSP/Traffic Class Clearing
- ECN Clearing
- URG Flag and URG Pointer Clearing
- IP ID Randomization
- DF Clearing

... the Scrubbing



What Worked

- TTL Standardizing
- TCP Option Standardizing

... the Normalization



End Results

Operating System

Windows 7

Windows Server 2003

Ubuntu Desktop 11.10

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6

Unprotected

Microsoft Windows 7 | 2008

Microsoft Windows 2003

Linux 2.6.X | 3.X

Linux 2.6.X | 3.X

Protected

Allied Telesyn AlliedWare

Allied Telesyn AlliedWare

Cisco IOS 12.X

D-Link embedded



Other Effects

- ⊕ Nmap
 - ⊕ Network Distance
- ⊕ Other Fingerprinting
 - ⊕ xprobe2
 - ⊕ Nessus ...
- ⊕ Other Tools
 - ⊕ ping
 - ⊕ traceroute



Deploying to Hardware

- ✚ Purchase the hardware from a local vendor
- ✚ Download OpenWrt kernel image with an embedded initramfs
- ✚ Setup dhcp & tftp netboot environment
- ✚ Connect to the routerboard
- ✚ Configure routerboard for DHCP
- ✚ Back up RouterOS
- ✚ Prepare the OpenWrt images
- ✚ Flash it



Deploying to Hardware



Flashing with OpenWrt/DebWrt

To flash the system you need to replace both the kernel and the root filesystem, which are two different images (you know if there is a different way...). To get to a command line you will need to boot a working OpenWrt kernel+in

Booting OpenWrt from the network

- **Get a working OpenWrt kernel image with an embedded initramfs.** To build this image, in the OpenWrt Make sure to use OpenWrt trunk (kernel \geq 2.6.39) and **not** the stable version, backfire. Backfire's kernel is not suitable for this job. OpenWrt will build a lot of images; the one you will use is "openwrt-ar71xx-nand-vm RouterBoot can boot (it expects to read elf headers). Alternatively, you can download a ready working image
- **Setup dhcp & tftp netboot environment:** Once you have the image, you will need to configure a tftp & dhcp scope of this article.
- **Connect the routerboard with rs232 and ethernet:** Connect the routerboard's RS232 with your computer **Eth1/POE** port (do **not** use Eth2-Eth5 as they are connected to internal switch and it is offline on bootloading). On your computer, setup a terminal emulator to get access to the serial port. A very popular one is minicom execute something like that: "sudo minicom -D /dev/ttyUSB0", where ttyUSB0 here is the serial device (assume that it will need to be run as root, unless you have access to the serial device (which is usually achieved by
- **Configure routerboard to use DHCP instead of BOOTP:** When the setup is ready, power up the routerboard. The routerboard will try to boot only with BOOTP protocol which is not what we want. So to change it enter the serial bootup process.

Demonstration



Challenges

- ⊕ Authorized Activity
- ⊕ Other Methods
 - ⊕ Banners and Direct Query
 - ⊕ Identification Through Layer-7



Challenges

- ⊕ Authorized Activity
 - ⊕ Scanners
 - ⊕ Management Platforms
- ⊕ Resolution
 - ⊕ Exclude them ...



Challenges

- ⊕ Banners and Direct Query
 - ⊕ Windows Networking Available
 - ⊕ Application-Layer Query
 - ⊕ OS Details in Reply
- ⊕ Resolution
 - ⊕ Perimeter Network
 - ⊕ Internal Network



Concerns

- Connectivity
 - Fragmentation
 - Upstream
 - Downstream
 - TTL Attenuation
 - TTL Special Uses
- TCP Options Sensitivity?
- Link-Local Routing Protocols



Concern

⊕ Upstream Fragmentation

- ⊕ IP ID Randomized
- ⊕ "Fragmentation Needed" ICMP Message Received
- ⊕ Host is confused
- ⊕ Keeps sending original packet

⊕ Resolution

- ⊕ Clear DF



Concern

- ⊕ Downstream Fragmentation

- ⊕ Each fragment given a different IP ID
- ⊕ Destination can't be reassembled

- ⊕ Resolution

- ⊕ End-Point Switch Placement
- ⊕ Exclude Fragments



Concern

⊕ TTL Attenuation

- ⊕ Packet travels more than 32 hops
- ⊕ Packet TTL is continually extended
- ⊕ Routing Loop occurs

⊕ Resolution

- ⊕ End-Point Switch Placement



Concern

⊕ TTL Special Uses

- ⊕ TTL recalibrated
- ⊕ TTL never runs out
- ⊕ Traceroute fails

⊕ Resolution

- ⊕ Exclude ICMP Echo Requests



Concern

⊕ Link-Local Routing Protocols

- ⊕ TTL of 1 for RIP packet
- ⊕ TTL of 255 is abnormal
- ⊕ Packet is malformed

⊕ Resolution

- ⊕ Exclude routing protocols



Concerns

- ⊕ Performance
- ⊕ Break Something
 - ⊕ Poorly Coded Applications
 - ⊕ What else?



Benefits

- ⊕ Shields from ...
 - ⊕ Casual Attackers
 - ⊕ Automated Assaults
 - ⊕ Oblique Threats
- ⊕ Protects ...
 - ⊕ Unmanaged
 - ⊕ Unpatched
 - ⊕ Unhardened
- ⊕ Defeats ... canned exploits



What's Next

- More Platforms
 - Open-Source Router Firmware
 - Linux-Based Switches
- Production Trials
- Talk to vendors



Final Thoughts

- Accurate target identification is key to a successful attack
- Identification that is way too easy for an attacker to perform
- Let's change that with fingerprint prevention
- I've proven that it can be done
- Now, we just have to make it happen



Proof of Concept

IDGuard v0.50 for Linux-Based Networking

- Fingerprint obfuscation support
- IPv4, IPv6, and TCP normalization
- Authorized Activity Exclusions
- Linux Kernel Module Implementation

SHA256 hash is **e97b2c8325a0ba3459c9a3a1d67a6306**
Updates can be found at <http://idguard.sourceforge.net/>






Links

- + <http://www.wisageek.com/what-is-packet-mangling.htm>
- + <http://www.openbsd.gr/faq/pf/scrub.html>
- + <http://www.linuxsecurity.com.br/info/fw/PacketManglingwithiptables.doc>
- + <http://chdir.org/~nico/scrub/>
- + http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/asa82/configuration/guide/conns_tcpnorm.pdf
- + http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/interfaces_modules/services_modules/ace/v3.00_A2/configuration/security/guide/tcpipnorm.pdf
- + http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/intrusion/packet-level-normalisation_1128
- + <http://nmap.org/book/osdetect-methods.html>
- + <http://rcp100.sourceforge.net>
- + http://wiki.hwmn.org/w/Mikrotik_RouterBoard_450G
- + <http://downloads.openwrt.org/snapshots/trunk/ar71xx/openwrt-ar71xx-generic-vmlinux.elf>
- + <http://downloads.openwrt.org/snapshots/trunk/ar71xx/openwrt-ar71xx-generic-rootfs.tar.gz>
- + <https://sites.google.com/site/guenterbartsch/blog/myfirstlinuxkernelmodule>
- + <http://www.farlock.org/nslu2/openwrt-non-standard-module-compiling/>

Special Thanks

- ⊕ Aditiya Sood
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- ⊕ Nick Pruitt





Q&A