DefCon 2013

# BYO-Disaster

Why Corporate Wireless Still Sucks!



We're just nerds with random ideas and inconsistent results!

### Why you should stay!

#### What

- Obtain Clear-Text credentials from any PEAP enabled WPA2-Enterprise Network without cracking a single HASH.
- O Get access to a new set of tools that automates all the attacks for you.

#### How

- Explore a "Functionality Issue" discovered with how IOS / OSX devices process MSChapV2.
- Demonstrate the use of EAP-GTC as the inner authentication mechanism in place of MSChapV2



Access Request
EAP Start

**Setup Stuff** 

Send Identity Again

MsCHAPv2 Challenge

Response with Client Challenge

Success w/ Challenge Response

**MsCHAPv2 Success** 

**EAP-TLV Success** 

**EAP-TLV Success** 

**Install Keys on AP** 

EAP Type Proposal

TLS Tunnel Setup

Inner EAP MsCHAPv2

EAP Success

TLS Setup S
Send Identity Again

MsCHAPv2 Challenge

Response w/ Client Challenge

Success w/ Challenge Response


**MsCHAPv2 Success** 


**EAP-TLV Success** 


**EAP-TLV Success** 

**EAP Success** 

**Finish Connection Stuff** 







#### Clear-Text Anyone?

Now that the MITM is complete, we can direct all DNS requests to our captive portal page and capture credentials in Clear-Text!

#### What Just Happened?

O IOS/OSX supplicants do not appear to require MSChapV2 success when connecting to the much for mutual authentication

Bypassing inner authentication

Establishing a MITM connection

 Trapping captive portal reques by default, and redirect it to ou

User re enters credentials whice clear-text. Hackers Win again!



#### Responsible Disclosure hahaha, funny!

"After examining your report we do not see any actual security implications. It is the responsibility of the client to ensure that they are communicating with a trusted server

before attempting the MSCHAPv2 inner authentication.


(The server could just as well have suggested the EAP-GTC protocol, after which the client would have provided its password in cleartext as the server instructed.)"




#### **GENERIC TOKEN CARD**

- EAP Method created by Microsoft/Cisco for use with PEAPv1
- Created to support hardware token cards and one time passwords
- Ø Similar to PEAPv0 EAP-MSCHAPv2 with no peer challenge
- Some clients do not state what type of password they are asking for, they just prompt for a username and password
- O Can we use this to our advantage?





Hi, welcome to the DefConSecure network or, more realistically, its evil twin. Time to chage that password. Want to know why? Track 1, 4pm, Saturday.



#### **Clear-Text Anyone?**


Thanks Radius, it was awesome of you to put clear text passwords in your debug file!

## GTC Attack – PEAPingtom

- - O IOS/OSX
  - Android (does not prompt for cert, NEAT!)
  - \*n?x works in Ubuntu but does require user setup
  - Windows safe for now, no native support
- No captive portal required, MITM attack is trivial and includes clear text passwords
- Instant capture of MSCHAPv2 passwords on IOS devices after user accepts certificate from evil twin.


#### Things You Need!

- Host system
  - Ubuntu 12.04
- Wi-Fi Adapter
  - Alfa AWUS051NH
- Radius Patch
  - PuNk1n.patch
- HAVOC-APPS
  - LootBooty Wi-Fi Tools



# A historical perspective

- Cracking hashes is too hard
- O Can we trick the client into just giving it to us?
- What if radius accepted everything?
- O Started with past work from other attacks.
- Unexpected discoveries





# www.LootBooty.com

Thank You!