Raspberry MoCA


A recipe for compromise

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
Media over Coaxial Alliance



- 8 12 large companies
- How to make use of widely deployed coaxial cabling to deliver content?
 - Shielded
 - Lots of frequency bandwidth
 - Carries signal 500 feet
- PHY/MAC specification
- Creates a network of the coaxial bus
- Delivers guaranteed bandwidths at certain distances




What does MoCA look like?




MoCA Operation: PHY

- PHY is the coaxial cable
- Frequencies & signaling
 - Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
 - WAN and LAN channel sets



MoCA Operation: MAC

- Media Access Control
 - Scheduled frames
 - Master node controller
 - Time Division Multiple Access
 - Assured speeds



PHY Rate (Mbps)	Minimum MAC Rate (Mbps)
≥275	139.87
250	130.78
225	119.45
200	107.74
175	95.64
150	81.98
125	68 37
100	54.65
/5	39.82

MoCA, definitely caffeinated

- Enables 'triple play'
- Desired by ISPs
- HDTV requirements
- Guaranteed speeds

More prevalent than Starbucks

- Most consumers don't even know they have it
- North American and European service providers already deploy it
- In other words, just about every broadband installation
 - FIOS
 - Cable/Xfinity
 - Dish/Satellite
 - DVR
 - STB




The Wall Wart

- Optical cable run from the neighborhood splitter to the home
- Optical Network Terminator (ONT) installed on the exterior of the home
 - Bridges the fiber to coaxial or CAT5 cable
 - ISP prefers coaxial → MoCA







MoCA Inside


- Actiontec Router
 - SPI firewall
 - NAT router
 - LAN WAN
 - 2 MoCA nodes (NC)
 - MoCA-to-Ethernet bridge






- Digital Video Recorder
 - MoCA networking on board
 - Depends on Actiontec router
 - Time sync
 - TV channel data


Let's draw that out a little more




No Keys Required




OH SNAP!



Remember, MoCA looks like this?



DOUBLE SNAP! IT'S OUTSIDE!



Walk up and jack in

- Utility point-of-presence
- ONT + root coax splitter + power = SCORE!
- Many homes have low plants growing around to obscure the equipment
 - That will provide useful cover for the attacking equipment



Tools of the Trade

- MoCA-to-Ethernet bridge
- RG-6 Coaxial Cable
- >1GHz Coaxial Splitter







Burning Bridges


- Connect the attack device to the bridge's Ethernet interface
- Actiontec LAN does not engage link protection
 - Any device can connect




What just happened here?

- A MoCA device has been added to the coaxial bus
- Remember, both MoCA WAN and LAN run on the same physical bus
- The bus terminates outside the home
- By attaching to the MoCA LAN, the internal Ethernet LAN has been extended outside the home

Situation normal



SNAFU



What could possibly go wrong?

- Enables attacks defeated by a firewall
- Network redirection
 - Address resolution protocol poisoning
 - DHCP response spoofs
 - DNS hijacking
- Traffic profiling
 - Deep packet inspection
 - What do you do at home that you wouldn't do at work?
- What's old is new again! Hello 2001!

Ethernet attacks, so retro!

- Enables direct attack against the local Ethernet network
- Many attacker tools and frameworks have been developed to automate infiltration
 - Ettercap
 - dnsniff
 - Metasploit
 - BeEF
 - EvilGrade
 - Karmetasploit



This tattoo will protect me from harm!

- MoCA filters
- Block signal in the MoCA ranges



- Marketed as a security layer to protect against unwanted MoCA signals
- Typically located on the feed to the splitter
 - Almost always exposed
- Designed to prevent signal bleed between houses
 - NOT between the interior and exterior walls.

Building a disposable attack unit

- This is a problem that needs more attention
- Create a platform to automate the compromise of a MoCA network
- Illustrate that the compromise of most target domiciles is as simple as walking up to them



Requirements

- Drop-in physical toolkit
 - Physical insertion
 - Power
 - Computing device
- Remote access to toolkit
 - Reverse tunnel, requires a server
 - Port forwarding?
- Traffic redirection
- Content manipulation

Design Objectives

- DO NO HARM
 - This is a demo for educational purposes
 - Random useless site redirection is obvious, nondestructive
- Use standard tools
 - Less profiling
 - Updatable
 - Disposable
- Minimize power consumption
 - Enable attacker to walk away and preserve cover
 - Unit must last as long as possible
- Control costs

Ingredients

- Cellphone Recharging Battery
 - Gorilla 16,800 mAh
 - Smaller than a paperback book
 - Can run each device on one unit (x2)
 - ~14 hours uptime for a 3VA device, like an ARM
- Raspberry Pi
 - Model B 512 MB RAM
 - ARM11 processor
 - Minimal power consumption
 - Requires 8GB class 10 SD Card for storage (OS)
 - Cheap






Ingredients


- Kali Linux
 - Standard penetration testing distribution
 - Has necessary tools Ettercap, perl, python
 - Extendable via Debian repositories
 - squid, apache, miniupnp
 - Available images for ARM, including Raspberry Pi
 - FREE
- Universal Plug-n-play IGD protocol
 - Actiontec firewall/router
- MoCA-to-Ethernet bridge
 - Netgear MCAB1001

Mod to MCAB1001 for better hang-time





Snip snip...





Like a good doctor, solder is there






Winner: Direct Current

- UPS lost a lot to DC/AC/DC conversion
 - 6.5 hours hang-time
 - BEEP!! LOOK AT ME!!
 - Managed shutdowns
- Portable battery DC/DC
 - No loss in conversion
 - Less hardware, smaller footprint
 - Size of a small paperback
 - One for each device (load)



Raspberry MoCA assembled




Universal Plug-n-Play

- uPNP enables service discovery on broadcast domains
- UDP port 1900
- No authentication
- No routing required, everything just blabs
 - iPhone
 - Computer
 - Printer
 - TVs DLNA
 - Router

Internet Gateway Device

uPNP protocol to ease manipulation of firewall rules



- Allows the firewall to adjust posture based on the requests of internal hosts
 - No authentication
 - Forwards requested ports and sets up NAT
- Most embedded routers support IGD
- Supported by Microsoft, DLNA, ISPs

How helpful!

Redirect Hijinks

- Transparent proxy needed to manipulate web streams
 - Squid provides URL_REWRITE facility to support 3rd party tools
 - Perl does the work
- I Love My Neighbors
 - Josh Wright's wireless honeypot distribution
 - Accomplishes my goals (flipping pics, funny things)
 - Perl scripts for URL_REWRITE
- Some BASH scripting to get it all set up

Recipe for Raspberry MoCA: Phase 1

- Insertion and remote access
- Upon boot, execute a uPNP command to forward an external port to local SSH server
 - {External IP}:22/tcp -> {Raspberry MoCA IP}:22/tcp
- Report information to attacker

Recipe: Phase 2

- Engage HTTP manipulation
- ARP poison the LAN

```
echo -n , Redirecting traffic
ettercap -D -l /root/etter.infos -m /root/etter.msgs -M arp // //
```

Redirect web streams to local proxy

```
echo -n , Redirecting ports
iptables --flush
iptables --table nat --flush
iptables --delete-chain
iptables --table nat -A PREROUTING -i etho -p tcp \
--destination-port 80 -j REDIRECT --to-port 3128
```

Manipulate the web stream

```
rm /etc/squid3/url_rewrite_program
In -s $SDIR/$1 /etc/squid3/url_rewrite_program
service squid3 restart >/dev/null
```

DEMO

• WATCH THIS!

famous last words....

Results

- ARM11 is single core and it shows
 - A little pokey for manipulating large images
 - Reduced apache and squid to 5 threads
 - Lowers CPU interrupt contention
 - Only use redirects or injections. Image processing is S..L..O..W..
- Traffic redirection
 - Network with six normal devices on it
 - Phones, DVR, computers
 - All redirected with no noticeable performance issues
 - Simple replacement of the word 'dog' with 'cat'
 - MoCA works well for this

Results

- Compared to attack injections
 - Images are huge payloads. Injections are small.
 - Static payload insertion does not require heavy processing
- Raspberry MoCA Platform provides
 - Guaranteed remote access for a defined time
 - Quick delivery and insertion. Minimizes exposure
 - Low cost platform. <\$300 is disposable
 - Commodity components. Minimizes profilable artifacts
 - Low-latency traffic redirection and manipulation
 - Find a resource and implant a more permanent backdoor

Security needs YOU!

- MoCA implementation presents a major exposure of the physical transport layer
 - All other assumptions about inside vs. outside are weakened
- IGD weakens firewall protections
- Bridging all networks together presents new vulnerabilities
- Requires reassessment and attention from cable installers and Internet providers
- Consumers should demand this!

Ongoing work

- Detect MoCA injections
- Alert on network insertion
 - Offer something more than ArpWatch?
- SLIM and Counter-Pi
 - in collaboration with Stephan Browarny


Questions?

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
Backup

Because sometimes things don't go as planned...


Man's Best Friend



The World Upside-Down



Watch Out, Plane!



Prove it!

