Weaknesses in Municipal Mesh Network Deployments

Dustin Hoffman & Thomas (TK) Kinsey
DEF CON 22

Dustin Hoffman

the researcher, not the actor :'(

- Senior Engineer @ Exigent Systems
- Principal @ various other concerns



Thomas (TK) Kinsey

- Senior Engineer @ Exigent Systems
- Principal @ 3Kappa Research



How it started

... open wifi network(s) available



The Transparent Society by David Brin

http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/4.12/fftransparent pr.html



Why are municipalities deploying these networks?

City services: police, traffic, 2-way audio, site monitoring, force multiplier, shrinking budgets:



Network implementation

Wireless mesh

Motivations: lower cost, shorten install time, no trenching, permitting



Project / Integration Vendors

E.g., LeverageIS

http://www.leverageis.com/







Implementation Hardware

Common off-the-shelf hardware e.g. Firetide/UNICOM, Bosh cameras, DVR/NVRs




Our Lab











Firetide specific info:

filesystem
reverse engineering
etc.



Implementation Protocols

802.11 2.4Ghz, 5Ghz, & 900Mhz

Mesh: Open standards vs AutoMesh

Interestingly, 2.4Ghz is in use, not mentioned

http://www.cityofredlands.org/sites/default/files/Purchasing/Public %20Safety%20Camera%20System%20Admin%202014%20RFP %205.5.14.pdf




Mesh in general:


- Multiple wireless paths
- Nodes aren't guaranteed a reliable connection to the backhaul
- Protocol provides node IDs, mesh health info, etc.




Wired




Mesh







Mesh in Our Specific Case





AutoMesh Specifics

- Proprietary & details not published
- 19 patents to date



AutoMesh Specifics External headers look normal

					SRCIP DSTIP
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802.11	DST addr	SRC addr BSSID	SEQ#	LLC/Ether	IP Header
8 0 0 0	ff ff ff ff ff	residence in the Tendence	50 ec aa a	aa 3 0 0 0 8 0	45 4 2 3f 0 0d 0 0 3e 86 63 3d
					Proto 134, RSVP-E2EI



AutoMesh Specifics
Header part 1 of 2

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A	\me	sh:	1					
P	me	sh:	1					
f9	e0	10	2d					
		Fı	ram	e t	ype			



AutoMesh Specifics Header part 1 of 2 (broadcast)



AutoMesh Specifics Header part 2 of 2 (broadcast again)

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AutoMesh Specifics


Enclosed header looks normal



This one's a CDP packet.



Specific case



https://mapsengine.google.com/map/edit?mid=zLPNQqdIZ4w4.klDGLs4MNr3w

Open before, now with WEP!!



Specific case

http://www.cityofredlands.org/sites/default/files/Purchasing/Public%20Safety%20Camera%20System%20Admin%202014%20RFP%205.5.14.pdf

http://www.cityofredlands.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Under the Watchful Eye.pdf

http://www.cityofredlands.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Video_surveillance_guidelines.pdf


http://www.leverageis.com/pdfs/Yucaipa%20to%20install%20city-wide.pdf



































This sign makes it all OK....





Security

- Access to transmission medium
- node authentication (bank calling/GSM)
- link encryption



Security

Direction antennae to "secure" medium



Security

- Content encryption
- Node authentication via PKI, not turned on
- AutoMesh as security / obscuration



Security

- Sloppy integrators
- No in-house expertise or on-going testing / pen-testing, 'cuz \$\$\$



Potential Threats

- !! Federal & State wiretapping laws, or more, may be applicable in your research. Please contact a legal professional
- IANAL
- info@eff.org



Potential Threats

- Observing video streams
- Multicast: subscribe yourself to arbitrary feeds



Potential Threats

Denial of service via:

- flood
- crude jamming
- oversubscribe



Potential Threats

ARP spoof: become a node or the NVR/DVR

... so dirty.



Potential Threats

Or easier:

- Join the mesh "legitimately"
- There are only 256 "mesh IDs"
- ... so dirtier.





Potential Threats

Access to internal municipal network / PD



Potential Threats

Video manipulation/injection "all's well"




Potential Threats

UDP increment attack




What The Watchers See UDP increment attack (1)






What The Watchers See UDP increment attack (2)






What The Watchers See UDP increment attack (3)





What The Watchers See UDP increment attack (4)





Potential Threats

 Non-video manipulation: infrared tripwires & area sensors to direct police resource or draw attention



Privacy Abuse & Misuse

- Long-term Archival
- General shenanigans (VZ tech, NSA 20 yr olds)



Demo is Sad 'cuz WEP 😊



THANK YOU!



